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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Danielle L. Fitzpatrick appeals from her conviction, entered on a conditional guilty plea,
for possession of methamphetamine and argues that the district court erred by denying her
motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In early May of 2019, at around 9:50 a.m., Boise Police Officer Jered Bish was patrolling
on a bicycle when he observed a distinctive Ford Mustang being driven by a white female. (R.,
p. 99. 1) Officer Bish then observed the same vehicle illegally parked between a “no parking”
sign and a stop sign near an intersection. (Id.) Officer Bish asked the driver, Fitzpatrick, to move
the vehicle back, in front of the “no parking” sign, so that she would be parked legally. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, Officer Bish again saw the vehicle parked illegally, this time two to
three feet from the curb. (R., p. 100.) Officer Bish activated his body-camera and went to speak
with Fitzpatrick. (R., p. 100; State’s Ex. 1. 2) Bish attempted to speak with Fitzpatrick through
the partially-open, driver’s-side window, but Fitzpatrick was “seemingly unaware or
unconcerned that Officer Bish was standing there waiting to speak to her.” (R., p. 100; State’s
Ex. 1, 00:24 – 00:50.) “Her speech while on the phone was rapid and incessant, and she was
wildly gesticulating with her hands and moving her head back and forth.” (Id.) When she

1

The factual recitation herein relies extensively on the district court’s factual findings, none of
which are challenged on appeal. (R., pp. 99-101.) References to “Tr.” are to the transcript of the
hearing on Fitzpatrick’s motion to suppress, held October 9, 2019.
2
State’s Ex. 1 is in the record in an mp4 filed titled “Bish 2 DUI__PCS(2).mp4,” and was
admitted by stipulation during the hearing on Fitzpatrick’s motion to suppress. (Tr., p. 42, Ls.
15-23.) References to the video are to the run-time.
1

acknowledged Officer Bish’s presence, “she put down the phone yet continued to behave
manically, persistently talking about various unrelated topics, gesticulating and swinging her
head from side to side.” (R., p. 100; State’s Ex. 1, 00:50 – 02:58.) “Her speech was difficult for
Officer Bish to understand and she often mumbled and slurred her words.” (Id.) “She would not
look at Officer Bish and it appeared at times that she was unaware of his presence.” (Id.)
Though it was cool out and she was “wearing light clothing,” Fitzpatrick “was sweating
profusely.” (Id.) Officer Bish interrupted Fitzpatrick’s monologue and asked if he could see her
identification, and Fitzpatrick responded that she did not have her driver’s license, but provided
her name, date of birth, and driver’s license number, as well as her registration. (R., p. 100;
State’s Ex. 1, 02:58 – 04:52.) Officer Bish stepped away to run Fitzpatrick’s information
through dispatch and, at the same time, requested a narcotics dog. (R., p. 100; State’s Ex. 1,
05:05 – 08:02.) When dispatch responded, he returned to the vehicle. (Id. 3)
Fitzpatrick again appeared to be on the phone, speaking in the same, unusual, fast-paced
manner, and “Officer Bish waited a few minutes until he realized that [Fitzpatrick] was not
talking on the phone but was apparently talking to him.” (R., p. 101; State’s Ex. 1, 08:02 –
10:19.) “She continued to ramble on excitedly about various topics. She could not maintain eye
contact with Officer Bish and he could hardly get a word in edgewise.” (Id.) Still holding
Fitzpatrick’s registration, Officer Bish then asked Fitzpatrick whether she “used anything today,”
noting that he had interacted with her previously and she seemed much more agitated and was
sweating despite the cool weather. (R., p. 101; State’s Ex. 1, 10:20 – 13:58.) Fitzpatrick’s
“manic monologue then turned to her mental health and aversion to drugs.” (Id.) Officer Bish
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At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Bish testified that he believed dispatch
informed him that Fitzpatrick had a valid license. (Tr., p. 33, L. 23 – p. 34, L. 3.)
2

was then informed that there was no narcotics dog available. (R., p. 100 n.4; Tr., p. 36, Ls. 2025; State’s Ex. 1, 13:50 – 13:58.) Over the next few minutes, Officer Bish asked if she had taken
any narcotics, whether there were drugs or weapons in the car, whether a drug dog would alert on
the car, and whether he could search the car, with Fitzpatrick responding by continuing her
monologue. (R., p. 101; State’s Ex. 1., 13:58 – 28:08.) Rather than providing any clear answers,
Fitzpatrick spent much of that time frantically explaining an issue involving her fiancé and a
debit card that was allegedly seized by officers in a separate incident, asking for Officer Bish’s
help in resolving that issue, and discussing her mental health history. (State’s Ex. 1., 13:58 –
28:08.)
Officer Bish asked Fitzpatrick if she would step out of the vehicle and talk to him on the
sidewalk, stating that he was having a hard time hearing her. (R., p. 101; State’s Ex. 1, 28:08 –
28:48.) Fitzpatrick declined. (Id.) Officer Bish again explained that he had “concerns” that she
was under the influence of a narcotic and was driving. (State’s Ex. 1, 28:48 – 29:13.) After
Fitzpatrick refused instructions to open the car door and told her passenger to likewise disobey
commands to step out of the vehicle, Officer Bish opened the door and assisted Fitzpatrick out
and to the sidewalk.

(R., p. 101; State’s Ex. 1, 29:13 – 31:45.) Officer Bish attempted to

administer a field sobriety test―the horizontal gaze nystagmus test―but Fitzpatrick “was unable
to concentrate and unable to follow directions.”

(R., p. 101; State’s Ex. 1, 31:45 – 36:49.)

Eventually, Fitzpatrick claimed that she was concerned she was having a heart attack and asked
for an ambulance, and Officer Bish called for paramedics. (State’s Ex. 1, 36:49 – 37:10.) At the
same time, another officer notified Officer Bish that there was a white crystal substance in plain
view near the driver’s seat of the vehicle, which Officer Bish then verified. (State’s Ex. 1, 37:10
– 38:00; see
- R., p. 101.) When paramedics arrived and attended to Fitzpatrick, Officer Bish
3

conducted a field test of the crystal substance and the test was presumptive positive for
methamphetamine. (R., p. 101.)

Fitzpatrick was then arrested on suspicion of DUI and

unlawful possession of a controlled substance. (Id.) Officer Bish secured a warrant for a blood
draw which was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine (PSI., pp. 94-95, 69-70), and
the white crystal substance on the floor of the vehicle tested positive for methamphetamine (PSI,
p. 72).
Fitzpatrick was charged with possession of methamphetamine and driving under the
influence of narcotics. (R., pp. 40-41.) The information was later amended to add a third count,
for misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 58-59.) Fitzpatrick filed a motion to
suppress, arguing that Officer Bish “lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain [her]
on suspicion of DUI and employ field sobriety tests.” (R., pp. 62-67.) Relying primarily on State
v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 367 P.3d 1231 (Ct. App. 2016), Fitzpatrick argued that her demeanor and
conduct during the encounter was indicative, at most, of ordinary nervousness associated with
interacting with law enforcement, which is not a significant factor towards reasonable suspicion
of criminal conduct. (R., pp. 65-67.)
Following a hearing at which only Officer Bish testified and his body-cam video was
admitted, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp. 99-105.) The court held that
[Fitzpatrick’s] nervousness is not at all typical of what one would expect for being
stopped for a traffic infraction. The video shows Defendant speaking rapidly,
repetitively, and sometimes hard to understand. She appears to be ranting to
herself, embarking on scattered, digressive tangents while Officer Bish attempts to
focus her with simple questions. She is visibility [sic] sweating on her face despite
the cool temperature and her light clothing. She does not make eye contact with
him. There is clearly more going on than nervousness. While she attempts to
explain her actions on her mental issues, such as anxiety and schizophrenia, her
behavior is bizarre enough to give rise to reasonable suspicion that a stimulant is
also a factor attributing to her demeanor. In no uncertain terms, Defendant was
what is colloquially described as “tweaking” throughout the entire encounter.

4

(R., p. 103.) “In fact, Defendant is so obviously impaired, the Court [found] her attempt to
characterize her behavior as mere nervousness frankly astonishing. Under no reasonable view of
the evidence would any court find such behavior is insufficient to give rise to reasonable
suspicion of DUI.” (Id. n. 7.) The court determined that Fitzpatrick was detained as part of a
DUI investigation when Officer Bish returned to the vehicle after having run Fitzpatrick’s
information through dispatch and, while still holding her registration, asked her about drug use.
(R., pp. 100-01.) The court determined that Officer Bish acquired reasonable suspicion that
Fitzpatrick was under the influence of narcotics before that point, very shortly after first
interacting with Fitzpatrick and while diligently attempting to resolve the parking issue. (R., p.
104.)
After the denial of her motion to suppress, Fitzpatrick entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to appeal the denial of that motion. (R., pp. 108-17.) The district court
sentenced Fitzpatrick to five years with two years fixed on the felony possession charge,
suspended in favor of probation, and 30 days in jail with time served on the DUI charge. (R., pp.
128-33. 4) Fitzpatrick filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 141-43.)

4

The paraphernalia charge was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. (R., p. 129.)
5

ISSUE
Fitzpatrick states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Fitzpatrick’s motion to suppress because
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a deviation from the
original purpose of the traffic stop?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Fitzpatrick shown that the district court erred by concluding that Officer Bish
developed reasonable suspicion of drug crimes during the course of his contact with Fitzpatrick?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Determined That Officer Bish Had Reasonable Suspicion That
Fitzpatrick Was Under The Influence Of Narcotics When He Began His Drug Investigation
A.

Introduction
Fitzpatrick argues that Officer Bish deviated from the purpose of his initial interaction

with her―to address a parking violation―and began a DUI and drug investigation when, after
running her name and registration through dispatch, he returned to her vehicle and “ask[ed] Ms.
Fitzpatrick multiple questions about controlled substances.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13

(arguing that the deviation for a drug investigation occurred at roughly 15:30:42, or 11:09 on the
run-time of the video, when Officer Bish first asked about narcotics); see also R., pp. 100-01
(district court holding that Fitzpatrick was detained for a drug-related investigation when Officer
Bish returned to the vehicle having spoken with dispatch, but retained Fitzpatrick’s registration
and asked drug-related questions).) As she did below, she argues that her demeanor and behavior
did not provide reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of narcotics because that
behavior suggested only that she was “nervous” about interacting with Officer Bish.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-15.) That argument fails. As the district court correctly found, relying
on both Officer Bish’s testimony and the video from his body-cam, Fitzpatrick’s demeanor and
behavior was “not at all typical of what one would expect for being stopped for a traffic
infraction” and “[t]here was clearly more going on than nervousness.” (R., p. 103.) “In no
uncertain terms, Defendant was what is colloquially described as ‘tweaking’ throughout the
entire encounter.” (Id.) Indeed, Fitzpatrick was “so obviously impaired, the Court [found] her
attempt to characterize her behavior as mere nervousness frankly astonishing.” (R., p. 103 n. 7.)
That characterization is no less astonishing on appeal.

7

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard. State

v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607, 389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016). The Court will accept the trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the trial court’s application
of constitutional principles in light of the facts found. Id. The power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences at a suppression
hearing is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993,
997 (1995).
C.

Officer Bish Had Reasonable Suspicion Sufficient To Detain Fitzpatrick To Investigate
Whether She Was Under The Influence Of Narcotics
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 5 A police officer may detain a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior “if there is an articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Wright, 134
Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d
520, 522 (1992)). Such a detention “is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal

5

Below, Fitzpatrick relied on the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp. 62, 87-90.) She does not do so,
however, on appeal. (See generally Appellant’s brief (including no citations to the Idaho
Constitution).) This Court “will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument
and authority in the opening brief.” Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257
(2012).
8

activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
“Investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” State v.
Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336, ___, 429 P.3d 877, 882 (Ct. App. 2018) (citing State v. Morgan, 154
Idaho 109, 112, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013)). “‘Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific,
articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.’” Id.
(quoting Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124). “The reasonableness of the suspicion
must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop.” Id. (citing State
v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999)). Reasonable suspicion
“requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the
officer.” Id. (citing Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709). “‘A determination that
reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).
“An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and
those inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.” Id.
(citing State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988)). “Due
weight must be given to the reasonable inference that a law enforcement officer is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience.” State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 474, 210 P.3d
578, 582 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Physical or behavioral indications of
drug or alcohol use can provide reasonable suspicion. State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 616,
329 P.3d 391, 398 (Ct. App. 2014) (relying on bloodshot and glassy eyes to support finding of

9

reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use); State v. Grigg, 149 Idaho 361, 364, 233 P.3d 1283,
1286 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 497, 198 P.3d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 2008)
(in determining that officer had reasonable suspicion to continue narcotics investigation, noting
that “Wilkes was excessively nervous while speaking with Deputy Strangio, and unable to stop
moving, which is also indicative of being under the influence of methamphetamine”); United
States v. Streck, No. 1:12-CR-157-BLW, 2012 WL 6022431, at *2-3 (D. Idaho Dec. 4, 2012)
(officer had reasonable suspicion that passenger in vehicle was under the influence of
methamphetamine where she was “(1) extremely nervous; (2) moving as far away from the door
as she could get; (3) fidgeting with her hands; (4) displaying jerky head movements; (5) refusing
to look the Deputy in the eye; (6) appearing pale or clammy; and (7) having a pulsating carotid
artery”).
Relying on the body-cam video and Officer Bish’s testimony, the district court correctly
concluded that Fitzpatrick’s behavior and demeanor provided reasonable suspicion that
Fitzpatrick was under the influence of narcotics, and because he had just seen her driving and she
was still behind the wheel of the vehicle, he had reasonable suspicion to initiate a DUI
investigation. (R., pp. 102-04.)
Officer Bish had been certified as a drug recognition expert and, though his certification
had lapsed, he had significant training and experience in the recognition of behaviors indicating
that a person is under the influence of narcotics. (Tr., p. 6, L. 16 – p. 8, L. 5.) The district court
specifically found that Officer Bish’s training and experience qualified him to recognize the
behaviors associated with being under the influence of a stimulant like methamphetamine. (Tr.,
p. 55, Ls. 2-17; R., p. 100 n.3.) Though Fitzpatrick notes that Officer Bish testified that his
certification as a drug recognition expert had lapsed, she does not challenge the district court’s
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finding that Officer Bish nevertheless had the training and experience necessary to recognize
behaviors indicative of being under the influence of methamphetamine.
Officer Bish testified that Fitzpatrick was “very animated, she was turning her head back
and forth, hands were constantly moving,” and her speech was “mumbling but constantly
talking,” in a low tone of voice. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 8-18; p. 15, Ls. 2-12.) She was “constantly
turning her head back and forth.” (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 19-22.) “It was very difficult to get her to
answer questions.” (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 13-22.) She was “constantly moving her head and arms and
just her upper body was moving constantly.” (Tr., p. 15, L. 23 – p. 16, L. 1.) Though it was cool
with a breeze that morning, and her passenger was not sweating, Fitzpatrick “had beads of sweat
on her forehead.” (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 1-10.) He testified that the behavior he observed was indicative
of being under the influence of a narcotic, and was not at all indicative of the common, ordinary
nervousness he often encounters during a traffic stop. (Tr., p. 16, L. 11 – p. 17, L. 17.) In
addition, Officer Bish had previously interacted with Fitzpatrick and she had not exhibited this
sort of behavior in their prior interactions. (Tr., p. 13, L. 18 – p. 14, L. 2; p. 16, Ls. 22-25.)
The video of his encounter with Fitzpatrick confirms Officer Bish’s testimony. As the
district court repeatedly emphasized below, it is difficult to watch the video without coming to
the conclusion, or at least suspicion, that Fitzpatrick was under the influence of narcotics. (R., p.
103-04, 103 n. 7; Tr., p. 48, Ls. 1-9 (“if one were to come up with a caricature of somebody who
is under the influence of methamphetamine and/or . . . ‘tweaking,’ I think they would just take
this and overlay it. I mean, she could not focus at all on anything, she did not stop talking the
entire time, she’s flitting from one topic to another, she’s sweating, she is extremely hyper,
extremely manic, frankly.”); p. 56, L. 23 – p. 57, L. 1 (“this is as manic as I’ve seen somebody,
and I see a lot of manic people in my job in mental health court.”)). From the moment Officer
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Bish attempted to engage with Fitzpatrick, she embarked on a virtually non-stop, manic, semicoherent, semi-responsive monologue; she was visibly sweating, though it was cool that
morning; she was gesticulating wildly and swinging her head, arms, and upper-body about; she
was frequently not looking at Officer Bish and could not focus enough to answer his questions.
(State’s Ex. 1, 00:30 – 04:53, 08:00 – 11:10.) “In no uncertain terms, Defendant was what is
colloquially described as ‘tweaking’ throughout the entire encounter.” (R., p. 103.)
In fact, defense counsel below essentially conceded as much. The district court judge
repeatedly observed during the hearing on the motion to suppress that the video was a perfect
exemplar of the behavior of someone under the influence of methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 48, Ls.
1-11; p. 49, L. 23 – p. 50, L. 6.) In response, defense counsel agreed, but suggested that that was
so only if you look at the entire video, rather than only the period during which Officer Bish was
allegedly required to develop reasonable suspicion. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 12-20; p. 50, Ls. 7-10.)
Defense counsel argued that that was the first three minutes of the video because a detention
associated with a drug investigation began when Officer Bish asked to see her identification.
(Tr., p. 48, Ls. 12-20; p. 50, Ls. 7-10; p. 53, Ls. 2-9.) But the district court rejected that view
about when a detention associated with a drug investigation occurred (R., pp. 100-01) and, on
appeal, Fitzpatrick concedes that the drug investigation began much later, around eleven minutes
into the video, when Officer Bish returned to the vehicle and asked questions regarding drugs
while still holding Fitzpatrick’s registration. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13 (arguing that a drug
investigation began at roughly 15:30:42 on the time-stamp, or 11:09 on the run-time of the
video).) But whether focusing on the first three minutes, the first eleven minutes, or the entire
video, Fitzpatrick’s conduct is consistent throughout.

If her behavior later in the video is

exemplary of someone under the influence of methamphetamine, that same behavior early in the

12

video is as well. Nor were Officer Bish, the district court judge, or defense counsel the only ones
who thought Fitzpatrick’s behavior was exemplary of someone under the influence of a
stimulant. The medic who examined her for a matter of minutes stated that she appeared to be
“high as a kite on something,” an “upper.” (State’s Ex. 1, 49:06 – 49:22.)
Officer Bish’s testimony regarding Fitzpatrick’s behavior, and the video directly
corroborating that testimony, support the district court’s conclusion that Officer Bish reasonably
suspected Fitzpatrick was under the influence of a narcotic. The district court therefore correctly
determined that the subsequent DUI investigation was lawful and denied Fitzpatrick’s motion to
suppress.
As she did below, Fitzpatrick urges the contrary conclusion by relying on State v. Neal,
159 Idaho 919, 367 P.3d 1231 (Ct. App. 2016), and State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 379 P.3d 351
(Ct. App. 2016). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-14.) In Neal, the Court of Appeals held that, “A
nervous demeanor during an encounter with law enforcement is of limited significance in
establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion because it is common for people to exhibit
signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity.”
Neal, 159 Idaho at 924, 367 P.3d at 1236. Relying on Neal and the proposition that the common
nervousness that might attend interaction with law enforcement does not contribute much to
reasonable suspicion, the Court of Appeals in Kelley held that the driver’s “nervousness,
evidenced by lack of eye contact, trembling, and pulsing carotid artery, is of limited significance
in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion.” Kelley, 160 Idaho at 763, 379 P.3d at 353.
According to Fitzpatrick, what Officer Bish observed and what is reflected on the video of their
encounter was just “behavior indicative of nervousness” associated with interacting with law
enforcement. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11, 13-14.)
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The district court below specifically addressed Neal and Kelley and correctly concluded
that those cases are clearly distinguishable. (R., pp. 102-04.) Both of those cases involved
ordinary, common nervousness associated with interacting with law enforcement. Officer Bish
testified in this case that this was not ordinary, common nervousness, but was behavior indicative
of being under the influence of narcotics. (Tr., p. 16, L. 11 – p. 17, L. 17.) Moreover, Neal was
an appeal by the state from an order granting a motion to suppress and, in that case, “the district
court observed that the videotape of the encounter did not support the officer’s testimony
regarding Neal’s anxious behavior.” Neal, 159 Idaho at 924, 367 P.3d at 1236. Here, by
contrast, the district court found that the video corroborates Officer Bish’s testimony and “[t]here
is clearly more going on than nervousness.” (R., p. 103.) As the district court stated, Neal and
Kelley stand for the proposition that “nervousness, basic nervousness, the kind we all probably
get when being pulled over and maybe sometimes a little bit more, like you say, trembling hands,
that kind of thing,” is not a significant factor for purposes of reasonable suspicion. (Tr., p. 52,
Ls. 14-19.) But, as the court correctly observed,
there’s got to be a continuum where nervousness gets into mania and it is [an]
indicator that somebody is under the influence potentially, at least articulable
suspicion they are, and it seems to me to the extent you have a line between
nervous and full-on mania, and to use the vernacular “tweaking,” [Fitzpatrick]
was at the far end right away.
(Tr., p. 52, L. 19 – p. 53, L. 1.) Further, as the district court recognized, “this is the exact
opposite of Neal” where the video apparently did not substantiate the officer’s testimony
regarding the defendant’s conduct. (Tr., p. 49, Ls. 1-9.) “You look at the video here, it’s not just
nervous in the form of sweating and the shaking or whatever, but she can’t stop moving her
limbs around, head around, can’t focus, can’t stop talking, one subject to another.” (Id.) The
video reflects that Fitzpatrick is “either intoxicated on a stimulant or perhaps having a manic
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event.” Id. As the video clearly shows, and as Officer Bish testified, this was not the ordinary
nervousness at issue in Neal and Kelley.
Finally, Fitzpatrick suggests that Officer Bish delayed in asking her to step out of the
vehicle, in conducting field sobriety tests, and in calling for a drug recognition expert, and those
alleged delays “were inconsistent with the officer’s articulated basis for the continued
investigation.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)
To the extent that Fitzpatrick is suggesting that whether there was reasonable suspicion to
detain Fitzpatrick hinges on what Officer Bish actually thought in the moment, she is mistaken as
a matter of law. “Probable cause and reasonable suspicion are objective tests. Neither test
depends on the individual officer’s subjective thoughts nor upon the bases previously offered by
the state to justify the stop.” State v. Spies, 157 Idaho 269, 273, 335 P.3d 609, 613 (Ct. App.
2014).
But, in addition, she is mistaken factually. While there is certainly some delay in the
events, the delay is associated entirely with Fitzpatrick, her failure to focus on the questions
being asked her, and her failure to follow Officer Bish’s directions. Having run her information
through dispatch, Officer Bish consistently but largely unsuccessfully attempted to focus
Fitzpatrick and get her to answer his questions regarding whether she had used narcotics.
(State’s Ex. 1, 08:02 – 28:13.) When he asked her to step out of the vehicle, she refused (State’s
Ex. 1, 28:13 – 29:13), and when they removed her from the vehicle, she refused field sobriety
tests (State’s Ex. 1, 31:45 – 36:49). She then claimed that there was a medical emergency,
prompting Officer Bish to request an ambulance. (State’s Ex. 1, 36:49 – 37:10.) While she was
being attended to by paramedics, Officer Bish directed another officer to try to arrange for a drug
recognition expert because it was then clear that Fitzpatrick would not submit to field sobriety
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tests. (State’s Ex. 1. 48:00 – 48:40.) Officer Bish worked efficiently and diligently. Any delays
were associated with Fitzpatrick’s inability to focus and to her refusal to cooperate.
The district court correctly determined that Officer Bish had reasonable suspicion that
Fitzpatrick was under the influence of narcotics, and so could lawfully detain her as part of a DUI
investigation. The court therefore properly denied her motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Fitzpatrick’s judgement of conviction.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2021.
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